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Los objetivos de este trabajo son destacar interpretaciones erróneas en la literatura del 
doble del dividendo de las reformas fiscales verdes, especificar que costes y beneficios 
deben ser atribuidos a cada dividendo, y proponer una nueva definición para el primer y 
segundo dividendo. Concluimos que el dividendo de Pigou es más apropiado que el 
generalmente utilizado dividendo de Ramsey. Finalmente, un análisis aplicado para la 
economía USA ilustra las ventajas de las nuevas definiciones propuestas en este 
trabajo: i) superar ciertos defectos en las definiciones utilizadas en la literatura que 
sobrestiman los costes de eficiencia; y, ii) proporcionar información útil para el decisor 
político en lugar de una visión parcial del marco más general de la reforma. 
 




The aims of this paper are to highlight misinterpretations of policy assessments in the 
double dividend literature, to specify which of the efficiency costs and benefits should be 
ascribed to each dividend, and then, to propose a definition for the first dividend and the 
second dividend. We found the Pigou’s dividend more appropiate for policy guidance 
than the usual Ramsey’s dividend. Finally, the paper analyzes a green tax reform for the 
US economy to illustrate the advantages of the new definitions proposed in this paper: i) 
overcome some shortcoming of the mainstream current definitions in the literature 
regarding overestimation of the efficiency costs; and, ii) provide information by 
themselves and not as a partial view of the whole picture. 
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This paper is concerned with the welfare analysis of green tax reforms, a two-
step policy scheme consisting of setting a tax on emissions and then devoting 
the tax revenue to finance reductions in incentive-distorting taxes (e.g., labour 
or income taxes). As a result, the government may reap a double benefit or 
dividend: a cleaner environment, and additionally a less distorting tax system. 
The implementation of each policy step linked to this kind of tax reform, 
however, involves efficiency costs and benefits both on the consumption of 
environmental and non-environmental commodities. 
 
The aims of this paper are to highlight misinterpretations of policy assessments 
in the double dividend literature, to specify which of the efficiency costs and 
benefits should be ascribed to each dividend, and then, to propose a definition 
to the first dividend and the second dividend. Therefore, we take up the recent 
claims about the need of unambiguous and operative definitions of these 
dividends both for empirical purposes, and policy advice. Finally, we analyze a 
green tax reform for the US economy to illustrate the advantages of our 
definitions for political implementation. 
 
The case for green tax reforms is well rooted as academic research on the 
double dividend hypothesis within the so-called
1 “environmental view,” (see 
Tullock, 1967, Terkla, 1984, Lee and Misiolek, 1986, and Pearce, 1991). These 
authors were mainly interested in the first dividend, assuming that reducing 
distorting taxes results in a welfare improvement, i.e., a positive second 
dividend. Their analysis, however, was built on a partial equilibrium approach, 
and had two important shortcomings: first, none of the proponents provided a 
full characterization of both dividends to allow for an unambiguous definition 
and policy analysis; and second, they failed to identify the interaction effects of 
environmental taxes with other distorting taxes, which might bring with some 
efficiency losses and would require a more general framework
2. 
                                                 
1 Schöb (1997) used the terms environmental and public finance view to classify the double 
dividend literature. 
2 See Goulder (1995), Parry (1995), and Parry, Williams and Goulder (1999). Among others, 


























































Along the 90’s a different strand of the literature, usually known as the “public 
finance” view, intended to overcome these difficulties by placing the discussion 
into the realm of optimal taxation in the general equilibrium framework 
previously developed by Sadmo (1975) (see Goulder, 1995, Bovenberg 1999, 
and Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002, for subsequent surveys). This line of 
research was mainly interested in the possibility of Goulder (1995)’s strong 
double dividend, taking for granted that setting an environmental tax improves 
the welfare related with the environment, i.e., a positive first dividend is 
achieved.
3 The main conclusion that can be drawn from this literature is that a 
strong double dividend occurs under rather “limited” circumstances (e.g., an 
initial non-optimal tax menu).  
 
Yet the “public finance” approach may be subject to two critiques. First, the fact 
that the strong version of the double dividend hypothesis compares the 
equilibrium after the tax reform with the previous status quo, instead of 
analysing the two policy changes (i.e., the new environmental tax and the 
recycling of revenues), has lead several authors to assign incorrectly efficiency 
costs and benefits: the first dividend strictly accounts for the environment-
related welfare changes after the green tax scheme is fully implemented, that is, 
the entire decrease of the externality; whereas the remaining non-environmental 
welfare changes are integrated in the second dividend. Consequently, this 
definition of the second dividend considers the non-environmental benefits and 
costs of green tax reforms. However, the goods being levied by the 
environmental tax accounts for a reduction in their consumer and producer 
surpluses; therefore, i) they are costs needed to improve efficiency and, ii) they 
should not treated as efficiency costs as some authors have done in the public 
finance approach, who consider “that an environmental tax is distortionary[, 
                                                                                                                                               
out that the double dividend hypothesis is flawed because it ignores the tax-interaction effect, 
i.e., by raising costs and prices, environmental taxes aggravate the distortions of pre-existing 
taxes (by reducing the labor supply below its already suboptimal level). 
3 That is, whether an environmental tax reform enhances not only environmental quality but also 
non-environmental welfare, so that gross efficiency costs are negative after substituting an 





























































Actually, the definitions provided by the proponents of the “public finance” 
approach seem of not great help to avoid these misunderstandings. For 
example, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) definition of the “double 
dividend” hypothesis
5 focused the discussion on the behavior of the labor 
market considering the effects on employment as the second dividend.
6 Others 
have considered different definitions, such as fiscal benefits;
7 economic growth 
in terms of GDP and consumption;
8  increased output and economic welfare;
9 or 
a mixture of them.
10 These vague definitions, noted also in Pezzey and Park 
(1998, p.545), may lead to misinterpretations of policy assessments, since it 
overestimates the true efficiency costs of green tax reforms;
11 in addition, some 
authors, like Patuellia, Nijkamp and Pels (2005), recognize the difficulty to 
undertake an empirical analysis of the double dividend as long as “there is no 
‘standard’ definition of the double dividend (or a standard method of recycling 
environmental tax revenues) in the literature.” (p.566-567), and claim for “the 
choice of an operative definition of the double dividend to be kept constant 
throughout our [empirical] analyses.” (p.576) 
 
The second critique deals with the fact that the definitions of the first and 
second dividends do not provide information by themselves, but they represent 
                                                 
4  For example, the Royal Society (2002) distinguishes four effects of green tax reforms, 
describing the tax interaction effect as “the distortionary effect of the pollution tax through its 
effects on raising the price of polluting goods.” (p.5). Accordingly, Royal Society considers that 
an environmental tax on polluting goods reduces their consumer surpluses, which represents an 
efficiency cost. Another example, Bovenberg (1999) denotes all gross costs as efficiency cost. 
5 “The hypothesis that higher pollution taxes associated with more environmental concern would 
not only improve the environment but also boost employment (and hence the tax base).” 
6  See, for example,  Bossier and Bréchet (1995), Kuper (1996), Carraro, Galeotti, and Gallo 
(1996), Majocchi (1996), Ligthart and Van Der Ploeg (1999), Jansen and Klaassen (2000), or 
Bayındır-Upmann (2004) 
7 For example, Morris, Révész, Zalai and Fucskó (1999). 
8 See Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1999). 
9 See Jorgensen and Wilcoxen (1993). 
10  Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) or Chiroleu-Assouline, and Fodha (2005).  
11 In this respect, it is illustrative that Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) have to state, to avoid 
misleading interpretations, that "these distortions in consumption patterns or input choice 
(primary costs) are desirable on environmental grounds" (p. 1501). They also recognize that 


























































a partial view of the whole picture. These definitions account for a global 
acceptance or rejection of a green tax reform, and not for the suitability of 
setting an environmental tax or the need to reform the tax system. Actually, we 
could trace the roots of this characterization in Ramsey’s optimal taxation theory 
when externalities are absent; so, the second dividend, as the way it is treated 
in the public finance approach, could be termed then as the Ramsey’s dividend. 
As a consequence, the requirement of a positive second dividend (as defined 
above) as a criterion to implement a green tax reform seems to be a very 
restrictive condition for the double dividend hypothesis. As Goulder (1994) 
noted, a positive second dividend would only prove the necessity to reform the 
current tax system, abstracting from any environmental concern.
12 
 
Clearly, these two previous critiques could have been avoided with an 
unambiguous definition for both dividends that did not create confusion among 
competing policy objectives, namely to reduce the level of an externality and to 
alleviate the tax distortions provoked by the fiscal system.
  
 
The present paper aims to clarify the debate about what should be included as 
efficiency benefits and costs in the measurement of the environmental and 
second dividend. In tune with Terkla (1984)’s spirit on the double dividend 
conjecture, the first dividend will measure the welfare costs and benefits after 
the implementation of environmental taxes when revenues are given back to 
households by lump-sum transfers. This first dividend comprises the net 
benefits from reducing external costs, the primary motivation for the 
environmental policy, which could be denoted as the Pigou’s dividend, in 
contrast to the Ramsey’s dividend in the public finance approach
13. On the other 
hand, the second dividend will measure the welfare changes from recycling 
green tax revenues through lower distorting taxes instead of lump sum 
transfers; this second dividend comprises the net benefits from reducing 
                                                 
12 In fact, some authors, like Bovenberg and Goulder (2002), have recognized that the 
environmental taxes could play an important role to ease political constraints to reform 
suboptimal initial tax systems, stating that “[...] environmental taxes are the lubricating oil that 
makes possible a tax reform to eliminate particularly bad taxes” (pp. 1507-08). 
13 It could be interpreted also in terms of Pigou’s taxes in opposition to Ramsey’s taxes. This 
terminology have been extensively used in the literature. See for example Mayeres and Proost 

























































distorting taxes, the secondary motivation for green tax reforms, i.e., the 
“efficiency value of tax revenues” in Terkla (1984)’s terminology
14. 
 
The proposed definitions show up two important advantages. First, it is avoided 
misunderstandings usually found in the double dividend literature, such as the 
identification between the second dividend and the efficiency costs of green tax 
reforms. Second, our definitions of the first and second dividends provide 
information by themselves and not as a partial view of the whole picture. Hence, 
the regulatory office is assisted to determine whether only a green tax should be 
set out regardless of the implementation of a green tax reform; or whether, 
additionally, raised revenues should decrease any distorting taxes. In fact, 
these definitions could be considered as a reformulation of Goulder (1995)’s 
weak form of the double dividend hypothesis,
15 which compares two policy 
changes with different recycling options. In addition, Goulder (1995)’s strong 
form is equivalent to the sum of the new first and second dividends put forward 
in this paper. 
 
For illustration purposes, we calibrated the theoretical model with a numerical 
example for the US economy on 1995. We simulated a green tax reform by 
introducing a $10 tax per ton of carbon with revenues devoted to reduce the 
income tax. We show that alternative definitions for both dividends arrive to very 
different conclusions: following the public finance approach we might conclude 
that the green tax reform improves welfare, but there is a negative second 
dividend as expected. However we found a positive double dividend when we 
use the new definition proposed in this paper. 
 
The paper develops through the following sections. In Section 2 we present the 
Pareto-optimal allocation and the competitive equilibrium in our general 
                                                 
14 Interestinlgy, this definition was already writen in Mayeres and Proost (1997, footnote 12) but 
as a result of a misinterpretation of Goulder (1995)’s terminology. There are several problems 
with Mayeres and Proost (1997)’s terminology: (i) the absence of a proper definition, (ii) it is not 
clear if their first dividend includes only welfare effects related to changes in the externalities 
only, and (iii) we can not be sure what they are really measuring by their first and second 
dividend in their empirical exercise when we compare explanations in main text, Table 2a and 
footnote 
15 That is, efficiency costs of a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform are lower if the 
additional revenues from the environmental taxes are recycled in the form of lower distortionary 

























































equilibrium framework. A feature of the model is that it allows to understand the 
magnitude of the inefficiency of market allocation of resources in the presence 
of externalities, and to compare the results (even graphically) in a general 
equilibrium setting with those found in well-known standard partial equilibrium 
analysis. Section 3 is concerned with the welfare effects of green tax reforms, 
and it aims to measure the first and second dividends in a general equilibrium 
set-up. It presents the competing approaches in the double dividend literature 
and shows that the "public finance" view overestimates the efficiency costs of 
green taxes. As a consequence, this section proposes a definition for the first 
and second dividends. Section 4 carries out a numerical example for the US 
economy showing that a positive double dividend could be possible, as 
opposed to the public finance approach, to conclude that the green tax reform 




2. The social optimum and the decentralized allocation 
 
This section presents a framework to determine the social optimum and the 
decentralized market equilibrium allocation of resources with externalities. This 
will be the benchmark set-up for further discussion on green tax reforms along 
subsequent sections. One contribution of this section is to establish the 
correspondence between the well-known partial equilibrium and the general 
equilibrium counterpart through a graphical analysis.  
 
We develop a static rational general equilibrium model with an externality. 
There are two types of agents: heterogeneous households in preferences, and 
firms. There are a number of perfectly price-taker competitive firms and a 
technology with constant returns of scale; therefore, a single aggregate polluting 
firm could be considered. Labor  N  is the only input required to produce a 
private good  () YF N =  and pollution (() ) EF N = Λ . This formulation recognizes 
the complementary relationship between the production of the private good Y  
and emissionsE . We will consider this relationship to be represented by a real 

























































considered a homomorphic function Ψ  on 
2 R+  such that 
() ()( ) () (() ) NY EF NF N Ψ= , = , Λ .  
 
Each household h is endowed with T units of time (e.g., hours per year) that are 
allocated between working time n
h and leisure time l
h. The model is static, so 
there are neither savings nor capital accumulation. Households enhance 
welfare by consuming the private good 
h c  and leisure time 
h l  and, in addition, 
the pollution E  produced by firms affects each negatively. Their preferences 
are represented by a twice-differentiable continuous utility function  ()
hh h UclE ,, , 
verifying  c U
h ∂ ∂ / ,  l U
h ∂ ∂ /  are positive and  E U
h ∂ ∂ /  is negative, and 
2 2 / c U
h ∂ ∂  
and 
2 2 / l U
h ∂ ∂  are negative while 
2 2 / E U
h ∂ ∂ ,  l c U
h ∂ ∂ ∂ /
2  and  c l U
h ∂ ∂ ∂ /




The Pareto social optimum level of emissions. The social planner maximizes 
the agents’ weighted welfare function subject to the technology to produce 
pollution and the private good, and the feasibility conditions: consumption of 







= ∑ ; the total number of hours 







= ∑ ; and, each household endowment of time is devoted to working 
activities and leisure, 
hh h nlT +=.  
 
The Pareto optimal allocations are given by { } 1 ˆˆˆ ˆ {}, , ˆ
h H h
h YNE c l = ,,  following the 
optimal Samuelson-Lindalh condition, 
 
                                                 
16The complementarity or substitutability relationship between pollution and consumption or 
leisure may be crucial in certain results. First, pollution could be considered a source of agents’ 
diseases, not related to the other variables. In this case, e.g., the quasilinear approach 
() ( ) ( )
hh h hh h h UclE ucl vE ,, = , + , pollution has no effect on labor supply. Second, pollution 
could decrease the “quality” of leisure, since agents cannot carry out certain activities (e.g., 
swimming in polluted rivers, etc.). Hence a complementarity relation to leisure could be taken, 
e.g., as  () ( )
hh h h h h UclE c vlE ,, = + , . Finally, pollution could decrease the “quality” of 
consumption (e.g., deterioration of consumer’s health, illness). Therefore, a complementarity 
relation to consumption could be, for example,  () ( )
hh h hh h UclE vcE l , ,= ,+ . In the last two 
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ () 1 (() ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
h h h
h h h
UE l c l
FN F N
UE c c l
µ
λ
′′ ∂, , / ∂   =− Λ     ∂, , / ∂
 (1) 
 
where  λ  and µ  are the positive Lagrangian multipliers, namely the former 
represents the social marginal utility from individual consumption of the private 
good, whereas the latter stands for the social marginal utility from pollution. 
Under this condition, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption equals the marginal productivity of labor at the optimum. In other 
words, an individual supplying one extra unit of working time increases 
production and their consumption, but also it rises the environmental damages 
suffered by society which the social planner must internalize. 
 
Decentralized level of emissions. In the decentralized competitive equilibrium 
firms maximize their profits, which must be equal to zero as long as we assume 
price-taker competitive firms and constant returns to scale. As a consequence, 
labour payment will be the only source of income, although households are the 





=− , where the real wage is 
w
P
. There is not a market for 
pollution; therefore, competitive firms do not care about the externality and each 
household takes the amount of pollution as given. Then we find the optimal 






 =  ,, , and the first order condition 
for allocation of resources. As a result, the marginal rate of substitution between 
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∂, , / ∂  = =.  ∂, , / ∂ 
 (2) 
 
Individual self-interest leads each agent to equate their private marginal rate of 

























































prices, which results in the equalization of private rates among agents. On the 
contrary, Pareto optimality requires the equalization of social rates and, 
therefore, conditions (1) and (2) permit us to show that the competitive 
equilibrium with externalities is not Pareto efficient.  
 
Pareto social optimum and decentralized level of emissions: a graphical 
analysis of partial and general equilibrium approaches. We can illustrate 
the previous conclusion with the usual partial equilibrium analysis (see Figure 
1). The MPB curve represents the Marginal Private Benefits from polluting 
activities, which is the sum of the consumers and producers surplus. In absence 
of public regulation, the competitive equilibrium at the level of emissionsE
∗ is 
determined by the condition of null marginal private benefits from extra 
consumption and production.  
 
 
Figure 1. Social optimum and decentralized level of pollution in partial 
equilibrium analysis 
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source: the authors 
 
The social optimum is determined by the intersection point between the 
Marginal Social Damage from emissions (MSD), that is the monetarization of 
the negative externality, and marginal private benefits (MPB) in Figure 1b. This 
result could be also represented graphically with the level of pollution that 

























































MSD. Therefore, the area (integral) under the MSD function in Figure 1b in the 
range  ˆ EE
 ∗

 , , over all individuals, represents the external social costs.  
 
It is straightforward to establish the graphical equivalence between the partial 
equilibrium analysis in Figure 1 and our general equilibrium framework. First, 
denote the function  ()
1 () () NE F E
− ≡Λ D . Then, the function  () (() ) EF N E ϕ
∗′ ≡ , at 
the right hand side of (2), is decreasing with pollution because of the decreasing 
returns to scale of the production function F . Intuitively, the increase in labor is 
more than proportional to the increase in production and emissions. Finally, the 
function  ˆ() () [ 1 () ] EE E ϕϕ σ
∗ ≡− , on the right hand side of (1), is also decreasing 
and always below  () E ϕ
∗  as  () (() ) 0 EF N
µ
λ σ
′ = Λ> . Second, the left hand side of 







UcE lE El h
UcE lE Ec MRS E
∂, , / ∂
∂, , / ∂ = . 
 
Figure 2 provides some hints about the amount of external costs in our general 
equilibrium setup. The term  () E σ , which is the difference between  () E ϕ
∗  and 
() ˆ E ϕ , is the marginal damage from one extra unit of labor supplied by agent h. 
Thus the area (integral) between these two functions in the range  ˆ EE
 ∗

 , , over 
all individuals, represents the external social costs. Therefore, it is 
straightforward to establish the equivalence between the partial equilibrium 


























































Figure 2. Social Pareto optimum and decentralized level of pollution in 
general equilibrium analysis. 
 
 
source: the authors 
 
 
The firm generating negative externalities will often produce too much, as in the 
partial equilibrium illustration in Figure 1. However, the general equilibrium 
effects, namely, the changes in price and income variables, may countervail 
these intuitive results of partial equilibrium analysis (see Laffont, 1988, p.14). 
The same could happen here. Note first that the slope of  ()
h MRS E  depends on 
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 =−
∂, , / ∂ ∂, , / ∂  
, (3) 
 
which could either take a positive or a negative sign. We explore three extreme 
cases for functional forms. First, pollution could be separable in the utility 
function, not related to other variables, e.g., the quasilinear approach 
() ( ) ( )
hh h hh h h UclE ucl vE ,, = , + . In this case, pollution has no effect on labor 
supply, the  ()
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pollution is greater than the optimum, i.e.,  ˆ EE
∗ > . The same happens if the 
individuals’ preferences will be specified such that pollution only affects the 
“quality” of consumption, for example,  () ( )
hh h hh h UclE vcE l , ,= ,+ :  ()
h MRS E  has 
a positive slope and again  ˆ EE
∗ > . However, if the preferences have been 
represented by a quasilinear utility function with a complementary relationship 
between pollution and leisure, i.e.,  () ( )
hh h h h h UclE c vlE , ,=+ ,, then the  ()
h MRS E  
would be decreasing. Firms will pollute less than optimum, i.e.,  ˆ ˆ EE
∗ < , if there 
is a strong enough complementary relationship between pollution and leisure, 
that is, in the case that the  ()
h MRS E  slope is lower than the  () E ϕ  slope in 
Figure 2. This result could never arise in partial equilibrium analysis as 
described in Figure 1. 
 
In the real world, however, a complementary relationship between pollution and 
leisure as well as between pollution and consumption are expected, so whether 
the  ()
h MRS E  slope is greater than the  () E ϕ  slope in Figure 2 is an empirical 
issue to be tested.  
 
 
3. The double dividend of green tax reforms. 
 
This section is concerned with the welfare effects of green tax reforms, and it 
aims to measure the first and second dividends of green tax reforms in a 
general equilibrium set-up. The main results in this section are the following: (i) 
the usual definitions of first and second dividends in the literature overestimates 
the efficiency costs of green tax reforms; and (ii) the analysis and definitions 
proposed below clarifies the welfare contributions of green tax reforms 
schemes, an issue of great interest for academic and political discussion on this 
kind of environmental regulation, as it will be shown in section 4.  
 
The decentralized equilibrium allocations found in the previous section are not 
Pareto optimal because of the externality. However, the government could 

























































resulting in second-best allocations.
17 We proceed first by illustrating green tax 
reforms as a second-best solution when distortionary taxes finance the public 
budget. Suppose that there is a Public Tax Office, an agency authorized by the 
central government to tax private agents, both households and firms, in order to 
finance some (exogenous) lump-sum transfers to households, i.e., 
h T  for 
hH ∈ . The menu of taxes  { } wcE ttt , ,  consists of taxes on income  w t , on 
consumption goods  c t , and on pollution  E t . The budget constraint of the public 









Tt E t T ltc
P == =
=+ − + ∑∑ ∑ . (4) 
 
The representative firm maximizes profits subject to technological constraints 





c T l T
P
w
t c t + − + = − 1 1 . Then it is straightforward to find that the optimal 
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UE l c l
FN t F N
UE c c l
τ
′′ ∂, , / ∂
  =− Λ   ∂, , / ∂












+ =  
 
represents the individual value of one extra unit of net income of taxes. 
Therefore, in a second-best equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution equals 
the market productivity of labor net of taxes. Observe that a rise on any of the 
tax rates moves the right-hand side downwards.  
 
Next we analyze the welfare effects of green tax reforms. For the sake of easier 
exposition, suppose that the welfare function is separable between consumption 
                                                 
17It might be Pareto optimal if the consumption, labor and pollution taxes are set as  cw tt =−  
and  E t
µ
λ = , but we presume positive tax rates, uniform across all individuals. HoweverAn 
environmental tax like  E t
µ
λ =  is not possible in the real world because of two reasons: (a) it 
should take a different value for each individual (actually, it is the value for optimal 

























































of environmental quality and consumption of other goods (leisure and the 
private good), so that any agent h’s utility function is given by 
() ()
hh h hh h h Uc lE uc l vE


 ,, = , + . The social welfare function is the weightened 
aggregation of individual welfare levels, that depends on the tax menu defined 
by the Public Tax Office,  
 
() ( ) () () () () EE E E Ut uCt Lt vEt ττ τ τ ,= , , , + , ≡   












  ≡, , , + ,   ∑  
 
where C and L are the aggregate level of consumption and leisure, respectively, 
and  h α  is the weight for household h.  
  
We characterize two scenarios: the pre-reform case with no environmental 
taxes (denoted as the benchmark case), where the tax menu is given by 
{ }
00 0 Ecw cw ttt tt


 ,, = ,, ; and, the post-reform after the green tax reform, where the 
tax menu will change to { }
11 1
Ecw Ecw ttt ttt
 
 
 ,, = ,, . In the benchmark case the social 
welfare level is given by 
00 0 0 (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) Uu C L E τ ττ ν τ    ,= , ,, + ,    , whereas 
11 11 11 11 () () () () EE E E Ut uCt Lt vEt τ ττ τ    ,= , , , + ,     is the welfare level achieved after 
the green reform. Therefore, the difference between the two scenarios welfare 
level, 
11 0 () ( 0 ) E Ut U τ τ ,− ,, represents the gains or losses of implementing the 
green tax reform. 
 
Finally, the welfare changes from green tax reforms could be decomposed 
between the first and the second dividend, following the double dividend 
hypothesis. A first or environmental dividend exists because environmental 
taxation reduces pollution and other negative externalities. There is a second 
dividend when reductions in incentive-distorting taxes results in a lower excess 
of burden. As pointed out by several authors (e.g. Labandeira, 1998), these 
definitions are too vague to permit a single interpretation or a precise 

























































hypothesis, gathered into two main strands referred to as the “environmental” 
and the “public finance” approaches. 
 
3.1. The environmental approach 
 
The “environmental view” is the departure point for the double dividend 
hypothesis, and was originated on the research of Tullock (1967), Terkla 
(1984), Lee and Misiolek (1986), and Pearce (1991). This view stresses the 
desirability of environmental taxation because they could give some extra-
benefits to society: first, they are one of the most efficient instruments for 
pollution control; and second, they provide an extra efficiency value when 
revenues finance reductions on other distorting taxes, instead of bringing them 
back to households by lump-sum transfers (see Terkla, 1984).  
 
Their analysis, built on a partial equilibrium approach, makes use of Figure 1 to 
highlight that emission level above  ˆ E  represents an inefficient allocation of 
resources. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce emissions and consumption in 
order to improve efficiency and social welfare. The area under the marginal 
private benefit (MPB) curve in the range [Ê, E*] represents the costs of reducing 
inefficient levels of emissions and consumption (i.e., lower consumer surplus 
from polluting goods). As a consequence, they concluded that there are no 
deadweight losses (efficiency losses) from green taxes as resources get closer 
to the social planner efficient allocation as shown in Section 2.  
 
But this is only true within a partial equilibrium analysis. The interaction of green 
taxes with other distorting taxes may raise some efficiency losses (see Goulder, 
1995; Parry, 1995; and Parry, Williams and Goulder, 1999). Unfortunately, due 
to the extensive use of partial equilibrium approaches, this view does not 
provide a full characterization of both dividends to allow for an unambiguous 






























































3.2. The public finance approach 
 
The “public finance” view has become the most widespread in literature in the 
90’s (see Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002, for a survey). This literature is mainly 
concerned with the non-environmental side of welfare changes from green tax 
reforms taking for granted a positive environmental dividend, which probably 
stems from the difficulty of economic evaluation of the environmental benefits. 
By circumventing these problems, this approach studies the efficiency gains or 
losses in the tax system after the introduction of environmental taxes, thus 
undertaking cost-effectiveness analysis that may be suitable for policymaker 
advice.  
 
Unlike the previous view, the use of general equilibrium tools within the “public 
finance” approach allows for a full charaterization of the first and second 
dividend (as an illustration, see Schöb, 1996; Hakonsen, 2001; Mayeres and 
Proost, 2001). The first dividend strictly accounts for the environmentally related 
welfare changes after the green tax scheme is completely implemented, i.e., the 
decrease of the externality, and it could be formalized as  
 
 
11 0 () ( 0 ) PF E FD u E t u E ττ    = ,− ,.    , 
 
whose positiveness is assumed by the public finance view. The remaining non-
environmental welfare changes are integrated in the second dividend, that is 
 
 
11 11 0 0 () () ( 0 ) ( 0 ) PF E E SD u C t L t u C L τ ττ τ    =, , , − , , ,    . 
 
Thus, the focus of the “public finance” view is on the second dividend and, 
mainly, on the efficiency of the tax system to raise fiscal revenues. Actually, we 
could trace the roots of this characterization in Ramsey’s optimal taxation theory 
when externalities are absent. So the second dividend, as the way it is treated 
in the public finance approach, could be termed then as the Ramsey’s dividend.  
 
The “public finance” approach may be subject to criticism. First, the definition of 

























































costs, which otherwise would “imply a redefinition of this term as commomly 
understood” (Bohm, 1997, p.121). We showed in Figure 1 that primary costs
18, 
represented by the area under the MPB curve in the range [Ê, E*], are the costs 
of reducing inefficient levels of emissions and consumption and should not be 
regarded as efficiency costs. As long as the Ramsey or second dividend, 
attending to the public finance view, considers the non-environmental efficiency 
benefits and costs of green tax reforms, this may lead to misinterpretations of 
policy assessments. Consequently, it overestimates the true efficiency costs of 
green tax reforms. In this respect, it is illustrative that Bovenberg and Goulder 
(2002) have to state, to avoid misleading interpretations, that "these distortions 
in consumption patterns or input choice (primary costs) are desirable on 
environmental grounds" (p. 1501), as well as to recognize that "the failure of the 
double-dividend claim does not imply that green tax reforms are inefficient" (p. 
1502).  
 
Therefore, it would be desirable to consider an unambiguous definition for both 
dividends which does not create confusion among competing policy objectives, 
namely to reduce the level of an externality and tax distorsions due to the fiscal 
system. Accordingly, it is attractive to have "a sort of separability in the tax 
structure, which might be taken to suggest that environmental taxes should be 
employed first, with the Ramsey taxes being used to fill up the tax revenue 
requirements" (Sandmo, 1995, p. 24). 
 
The second critique refers to the fact that the definitions of the first and second 
dividends do not provide information by themselves, but they represent a partial 
view of the whole picture. These definitions accounts for a global acceptance or 
rejection of a green tax reform, and not for the suitability of setting an 
environmental tax or the need to reform the tax system. This global assessment 
is not in tune with Terkla (1984)’s spirit on the double dividend conjecture. As a 
consequence, the requirement of a positive second dividend (as defined above) 
as a criterion to implement a green tax reform seems to be a very restrictive 
condition for the double dividend hypothesis. Goulder (1995) noted that a 
                                                 
18 For an illustration of the diverse effects related to environmental taxes, e.g., primary costs, tax 

























































positive second dividend would only prove the necessity to reform the current 
tax system, abstracting from any environmental concern.
19 Accordingly, we 
suggest that more orthodox analyses should consist of integrating Ramsey and 
Pigou approaches establishing a parallelism with Bovenberg and Goulder 
(2002, pp.1484-5).  
 
3.3. A proposal of definition 
 
Next, we propose a new definition for both dividends that overcome both 
critiques, and formalizes Goulder (1995)’s weak form of the double dividend 
hypothesis. The first dividend will measure the welfare costs and benefits after 
the implementation of environmental taxes when revenues are given back to 
households by lump-sum transfers, and it will be formalized as 
 
new FD =
10 0 () ( 0 ) E Ut U ττ ,− ,=  
=
10 0 10 10 0 0 ( ) (0 ) ( ) ( ) (0 ) (0 ) EE E uE t uE uC t L t uC L ττ τ ττ τ        ,− ,+ , ,,− , , ,.         
 
These are the net benefits from reducing external costs, the primary motivation 
for the environmental policy. Accordingly, it could be denoted as the Pigou’s 
dividend, in contrast to the Ramsey’s dividend in the public finance approach. 
Therefore, the Public Tax Office should set an environmental tax  E t  whenever 
the first dividend has a positive sign. The second dividend will measure the 
welfare changes from recycling green tax revenues through lower distorting 
taxes instead of lump sum transfers, that is 
  
new SD =
11 10 () () EE Ut Ut ττ ,− ,=  
 
11 10 11 11 10 10 () () () () () () EEE EE E u E tu E tu C t L tu C t L t τττ ττ τ       =, −, +, , , −, , , .        
 
                                                 
19In fact, this author distinguishes between the weak double dividend and the strong double 
dividend. The latter stands whenever a positive second dividend exists. The former holds as 
long as green tax reforms achieve higher welfare levels by cutting existing distorting taxation, 
financed by environmental tax revenues, instead of returning the revenues to taxpayers by 
lump-sum transfers. There is no theoretical or empirical controversy about the achievement of 
weak double dividends by green fiscal reforms (lump-sum transfers do not provide any extra 
benefit to the economy). Researchers have turned to looking for conditions to get positive 
strong double dividends, assuming some effectiveness on pollution reduction. The weak and 
strong dividend definitions arose as a consequence of the rather limited meaning of the double 

























































These are the net benefits from reducing distorting taxes, the secondary 
motivation for green tax reforms, i.e., the “efficiency value of tax revenues” in 
Terkla (1984)’s terminology. The reduction in distorting taxes affects labor 
supply and consumption which increase production and welfare as well; 
besides, some costs arise due to increased pollution from higher production 
levels go with, which also increase pollution.  
 
Observe that our definitions make clearer Pezzey and Park (1998, sec.4) 
exposition, avoiding some shortcomings (see their footnote 3), and could be 
rewritten as follows. The weak form of the double dividend claim is that 
) , ( ) , (
0 1 1 1 τ τ E E t U t U > , also known as the “revenue-recycling effect”; that is, 
welfare is raised by using the revenue of the environmental tax to lower the 
distortionary tax instead of to give taxpayers lump sum subsidies. And, the 
strong form is that 
11 0 () ( 0 ) E Ut U τ τ ,> ,; that is, there is an economic benefit from 
the revenue-neutral substitution of a new environmental tax for a change in a 
typical distortionary tax, so that the regulatory office should fully implement a 
green tax reform. With regard to our proposal of definition, the strong form is 
equivalent to the sum of the new first and second dividends put forward in this 
subsection. 
 
Our definitions of the first and second dividends have relevant implications for 
policy implementation, as they establish a criterium on whether only a green tax 
should be set out or whether, additionally, raised revenues should decrease any 
distorting taxes. Besides, it avoids misleading interpretations like identification 
of gross costs from green tax reforms with efficiency costs.  
 
Next we show the advantages of our definition with respect to alternative one 
for political assessment in a numerical example for 1995 US data. 
 
4. An illustration for the US economy 
 
In this section, we undertake the experiment of introducing a green tax reform 
for the 1995 US economy. Our main goal is to compare our definition of the first 

























































numerically assess the policy implications of the implementation of a green tax 
reform in a general equilibrium model.  
 
The set-up is the same as the one studied in previous sections, except for one 
extension on the supply side. Instead of one technology that produces one 
output with the labor input, we will consider two technologies that produce two 
final goods in the economy: an energy-intensive good  X  and a non-energy-
intensive good Y , both produced with two inputs, labor L and an intermediate 
pollution input, P  (Power). These extensions will be shown to be useful for 
improving the model’s ability to gauge the empirical significance of competing 
definitions for the dividends.
20 In the appendix, we compute analitically a 
simplified version of this general equilibrium model without intermediate inputs, 
which displays algebraically the relationship between different definitions of the 
first and second dividend
21; furthermore, it allows us to understand why a green 
tax reform cannot achieve the optimal tax menu. In order to undertake a 
numerical example, we take the following functional forms.
22 The production 
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where γ , ϑ , δ  and  i ρ  are technological parameters and  i σ  is the elasticity of 
substitution between inputs satisfying the condition that  1( 1 ) ii σ ρ =/ − . 
Preferences are also assumed to be represented by two nested CES utility 
                                                 
20For example, if there is only one good, it is easy to show that any tax menu is always 
burdened by the same item. Consequently, the equilibrium allocations after a green tax reform 
are exactly the same as the initial one. Interestingly, this means that the public finance view 
definitions of first and second dividends are both equal to zero, whereas ours are not zero but 
with the opposite sign. 
21This approach is justified because derivation of first-order conditions from the numerical model 
is much more complicated and the expression for the dividends becomes meaningless. 
22See Parry, Williams and Goulder (1999) for a similar approach. Analogous to that paper, we 


























































functions with environmental damages included as a separable element 
affecting individual welfare: in the outer nest, the CES function combines the 
consumption of leisure l  and goods produced by the firms C ; while the inner 
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where  α ,  β ,  c ρ ,  u ρ  and φ  are parameters of the preferences. The disutility 
from pollution, represented by φ , is taken from the benefits of carbon 
abatement (the marginal value of external damages), and set equal to $20 per 
ton of carbon, that is  () 2 0 E E φ = , which is an average of the estimations found 
in the literature (for instance, see Tol, 2005)
23. Parameter  u ρ  is related to the 
substitution possibilities between consumption of goods and leisure, and  c ρ  is 
related to the substitution possibilities between consumption of  X  and Y . As in 
Parry et al. (1999), the parameter controlling the sensitivity of labor supply to 
the after-tax wage  u σ  is equal to 12 0 . , which implies an uncompensated and 
compensated labor supply elasticity of 15 .  and 03 . , respectively; besides, non-
sleep leisure time equals 0.3 times hours worked. For simplicity, we assume 
unitary elasticity of substitution between inputs and goods in the production and 
utility functions, respectively. That means a Cobb-Douglas function 
characterizing the consumption and production of final goods. Therefore, the 
elasticity of substitution  u σ  between consumption C  and leisure l  in the 
welfare function and between labor L and energy P  in the production function 
i σ  are equal to one. At the end of this section, we will undertake a sensitivity 
analysis to test the robustness of the results under different parameter values.  
 
The baseline labor tax rate, is equal to 40%, which takes into account the sum 
of federal income, state income, payroll and consumption taxes: “This average 
rate is relevant for the participation decision” (Parry et al, 1999; p.65). This 
                                                 
23 Actually, this represents a conservative parameter. Burtraw and Toman (2001) reviewed 
some empirical evidence about ancillary benefits in the US, and concluded that average 

























































means that the distorting tax ratio 
0 τ  is equal to 60%. All tax revenues are given 
back to the households as a lump-sum transfer. This convenient simplification 
allows us to overlook public expenditures without loss of generality. The 
household’s budget constraint is:  
 
  (1 ) ( )
y hh h h
xx
P w








+= + − +  
 
The benchmark data set for the US economy in the year 1995 is summarized in 
Table 1. As mentioned, only two final goods,  X  and Y , are produced in the 
economy (455 124 7 ,.  and 2 714 243 2 ,,.  millions of 1995 dollars). The consumption 
of energy P  for the production of the two final goods,  X  and Y , is responsible 
for 1 423 6 ,.  millions of tons of carbon emissions E  to the atmosphere.
24  
 
Table 1. Benchmark data for the numerical model 
 
  P X  Y TIV  TCV 
P   47,349.1  5,795.3  53,144.4   
X         455,124.7 
Y         2,714,243.2 
L  53,144.4 407,775.6  2,708,447.9  3,169,367.9   
TOV  53,144.4 455,124.7  2,714,243.2    3,169,367.9 
Leisure         932,167 
E   1,268.4  155.2     
Source: own computations from Parry et al (1999, Table I). 
Note: TOV is total output value; TIV total input value and TCV total consumption value. All values are in 
millions of 1995 US dollars except carbon emissions (in million tons). 
 
Now we are ready to undertake a green tax reform and to compare different 
definitions of the first and second dividends. We simulate the introduction of an 
exogenously given green tax 
1
E t  equal to $10 per ton of carbon. This is a 
relatively low tax rate, so we follow a precautionary approach in order to derive 
robust conclusions from our analysis. It is similar to some international 
estimation of equilibrium prices for carbon permits in an international carbon 
market with grandfathering allocation of tradeable pollution permits for achieving 
Kyoto commitments (for instance, see the surveys by Springer, 2003, and 
Springer and Varilek, 2004).  
                                                 
24We suppose a constant technical relationship between consumption of energy and emissions. 
At the benchmark data, the consumption of one dollar of energy generates 0.026787394 tons of 


























































The environmental tax is modelled as an excise tax on the consumption of 
energy  P  given the close relationship between consumption of this good and 
emissions. Revenue recycling through a lower labour tax rate complete the 
green tax reform with transfers fixed at the benchmark level, so that 
1 τ =60.48%. The effects of the green tax reform on emissions, production 
activities and prices are summarized in Table 2.  
 
The increase in the price of energy P  provokes, as expected, a significant 
reduction in the production and consumption of energy (-20.9%). That reduces 
carbon emissions to the atmosphere by the same rate. The rise in energy prices 
increases the costs in the energy-intensive sector  X  whose prices increase 
(+2.1%), and reduces activity levels in that sector. Accordingly, in the economy 
there is a substitution of non-energy intensive goods Y  for energy intensive 
goods  X  which are now cheaper in relative terms ( 03 % − .  reduction in relative 
prices for Y ). As a consequence of all these changes in economic and 
environmental variables, there is a relative increase in welfare ( 0 112% +. ) with 
respect to the benchmark, and equal to 4 561 98 , .  million 1995 US dollars as it is 
shown in Table 3. Therefore, the green tax reform is welfare-improving and it 
should be implemented.  
 
Table 2. Results from simulated reforms. Relative changes (in percentage) 
on emissions, prices, production and welfare with respect to the 
benchmark 
 
  Green Tax Reform  Lump Sum 
  Activity level  Prices  Activity level  Prices 
P  - 20.9  + 26.4  - 20.9  + 26.8 
X  - 2.1  + 2.1  - 2.2  + 2.5 
Y  + 0.3  - 0.3  + 0.2  + 0.1 
L 0.0  0.0  -  0.1  0.0 
E  - 20.9    - 20.9   
Total Welfare  + 0.112    + 0.086   
Note: Labor is the numeraire. Therefore all changes on prices are expressed as relative changes with 
respect to the price of labor. 
 
The contribution of this section is to assign the welfare changes from the green 
tax reform between the first and the second dividends. In Table 3, we show the 

























































from different definitions of dividends. These welfare measures were estimated 
using the definitions in Section 3 and the data in Table 2. The public finance 
approach concludes that there is not a positive double dividend because the 
second dividend is negative, as it is usually found in the literature (see the 
survey in Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). That is, the effects of the green tax 
reform on consumption and leisure reduce the efficiency in the economy (using 
Goulder 1995’s terminology).  
 
Table 3. First and second dividends and welfare gains after the green tax 
reform. 
 
  Public Finance  New 
 US$ % US$  %
First Dividend  + 5,953 + 0.146 + 3,514.75  + 0.086
Second Dividend  - 1,398.7 - 0.034 + 1,047.23  + 0.026
Total Welfare Variation  + 4,561.98 + 0.112 + 4,561.98  + 0.112




However, we reached a very different conclusion when we used the definitions 
proposed in this paper (column denoted by “New"). The second dividend now 
has a positive sign, and the first dividend is still positive but lower than the 
counterpart for the public finance. Note that the value of the first dividend now 
corresponds to the welfare changes following the lump-sum reform as reported 
in Table 2; that is, the revenues from a $10 tax per ton of carbon are given back 
to households by lump-sum transfers and 
01 τ τ = . So we can assert two 
conclusions: first, the environmental tax is welfare-improving, and therefore it 
should be implemented independently of the green tax reform; and, second, 
there is an efficiency value of revenues raised by the environmental tax so there 
exist some extra benefits from a green tax reform. 
 
There are key policy implications stemming from these results. As mentioned 
above, the main interest of the “public finance” approach is on the second 
dividend for two main reasons: the difficulty of economic evaluation of 
environmental benefits, and the fact that the definition of the second dividend is 
appropriate for cost-effectiveness analysis. Following this approach, the green 

























































public finance terminology by an amount equal to 1 398 7 , .  million 1995 US 
dollars. As argued before, some costs included in this second dividend do not 
represent a drop in efficiency when we use careful analysis. Furthermore, 
rejection should take place only when a 20.9% reduction in carbon emissions is 
not enough to counterbalance the above drop in efficiency within a cost-
effectiveness analysis. In general, we may conclude that inaccurate negative 
evaluations of green tax reforms by the “public finance” view may have been 
undermining their implementation in some OECD countries since the 90’s. 
 
Finally, we undertake a sensitivity analysis of the results involving the increase 
and reduction of 50% in the benchmark value of the elasticity parameters in the 
production and utility functions. Table 4 shows the relative changes (in 
percentage) in emissionsE , aggregate welfare without pollution  ()
hh h Ucl , , and 
also total welfare  ()
hh h UclE ,,  that includes environmental damages following 
the application of the green tax reform. In general, there is no significant change 
except some sensitivity of results to the value of substitution elasticity between 
inputs in the production. With that evidence, we may conclude that the results in 
Tables 2 and 3 are robust in qualitative terms, despite, of course, there exist 
some significant changes in quantitative values. 
 








h, E)     E 
Benchmark Case (Tables 2 and 3)  -0.034  0.112  -20.9 
Production Elasticity ( i σ =1)      
i σ =1.5  -0.047 0.157  -29.0 
i σ  =0.5  -0.020 0.063  -11.9 
Labour Supply Elasticity ( u σ =1.2)      
u σ =1.8  -0.036 0.110  -20.9 
u σ =0.6  -0.032 0.114  -20.9 
Consumption Elasticity ( c σ =1)      
c σ =1.5  -0.035 0.116  -21.6 
c σ  =1.5  -0.033 0.108  -20.2 
Note: Percentage deviations (%) with respect to benchmark welfare levels and emissions. Benchmark 





























































The popularity of green tax reforms as a relevant policy option increased rapidly 
at the beginning of the nineties to fall shortly at the end of the same decade. As 
argued in this paper, this quick rise and fall is related to the fact that mainstream 
double dividend literature advocated divergent approaches at different moments 
in time. Now tradable pollution permits have took the lead in the policymaker’s 
agenda despite analyses showing that green tax reforms may be superior (see 
Parry, Williams and Goulder, 1999). 
 
The double dividend hypothesis argues that two benefits or "dividends" may be 
attained, namely a better environment and a less distorting tax system, so that it 
could represent a win-win policy. Thus, a correct definition and, therefore, a 
correct measurement of both dividends are of great relevance for policy-makers 
advice, and for any policy recommendation. In this paper we specified which of 
the efficiency costs and benefits should be ascribed to the first dividend and the 
second dividend, highlighting misinterpretations of policy assessments in the 
double dividend literature. 
 
For this purpose, the paper presents a general equilibrium set-up with a 
pollutionary externality and provides a new definition for the first dividend and 
the second dividend conformed to the double dividend hypothesis. Our 
definitions show up two important advantages. First, it is avoided 
misunderstandings such as the identification between the second dividend and 
the efficiency costs of green tax reforms, usually found in the double dividend 
literature. Second, they provide information by themselves and not as a partial 
view of the whole picture. Hence, the regulatory office is assisted to determine 
whether only a green tax should be set out regardless of the implementation of 
a green tax reform; or whether, additionally, raised revenues should decrease 
any distorting taxes. Accordingly, we believe that these definitions will contribute 
to clarify the debate and represent operative definitions of the double dividend 



























































As an illustration, we calibrated the theoretical model with a numerical example 
for the US economy on 1995. We simulated a green tax reform by introducing a 
$10 tax per ton of carbon with revenues devoted to reduce the income tax to 
find that alternative definitions reached very different conclusions: while the 
public finance approach concludes that the green tax reform improves welfare 
but -as expected- there is a negative second dividend, the new definition 
proposed in this paper recognizes a positive double dividend. 
 
As a conclusion, a relevant consequence with significant policy implications 
refers to the fact that the "public finance" approach overestimates the efficiency 
costs of green taxes: negative evaluations of green tax reforms by the "public 
finance" view may have been undermining their implementation in some OECD 
countries since 90's. Thus the results obtained by either the empirical and 
theoretical literature may have lead economists and policymakers to favour the 
use of instruments like grandfathering pollution permits instead of taxes, which 
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Measuring the dividends in an analytical example 
 
 
In this appendix, in a simple analytical example, we illustrate the definitions of first and second 
dividends proposed above and we compare them with those proposed by the public finance 
approach. Besides, this analytical framework will be useful for showing that a green tax reform 
does not need to be an optimal taxation policy.   
 
Consider the same economy as that studied in Section 2, but now there are two goods in the 
economy:  X  is produced with a dirty technology and Y  is produced with a clean technology. 
The budget constraint is:  
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There are H  identical households with preferences represented by the utility function 
1
12 () [ ] ( )
hh h UclE c l E
ρρ ρ αα φ
/ ,, = + − , with 
1 [] xy y cXY
σ σσ ββ
/ =+  taken from Parry et al 
(1999), where  () φ  is an increasing and concave function that represents disutility from 
pollution. In order to compute the equilibria analytically, we choose  1 ρ =  and  0 σ = , set 
21 (1 ) β β =−  and  21 (1 ) α α =− , and reparametrize  1 α α ≡  and  x β β ≡ . The production 
technology for both goods is linear,  () xx X FN A N = =  and  () yy YF N D N = = , and 
pollution is proportional to production  () B
A EYX = Λ= . This greatly simplifies the labor market 
equilibrium by setting the real wages at the infinitely elastic demand 
x
w
E P At B = − , and the 
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The interior competitive equilibrium. Consider the proposed menu of taxes and the supply of 
the public sector good are { } 1 {}
hH
hE c w Tt t t g = ,,,, . For simplicity, we will assume that there is no 
public expenditure. The competitive equilibrium when all taxes are considered, that is, 
{ } Ecw ttt ,,  and  0 g = , where tax revenue is evenly given back to households 
h T , is obtained 
from the first-order conditions and government budget constraint:  
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with  0 (1 ) KT α =− , and 
2 (1 )




− =−. The aggregate utility function is 
( ) ()
hh h
Eh h Ut U c l E τα ,= , , ∑ , where  h α  is the household weights for the government 
which, for simplicity, will be set equal for all,  1 h α = .  
 
A green tax reform. The benchmark is an economy where the menu of taxes without supply of 
the public sector good is { } { }
00 0
11 {} { } 0 0
hH h H
hE c w h c w Tt t t gT t t == ,,,, = , ,,, . That is, all tax revenue 
is always given back to households, and no pollution tax exists, i.e., 
0 0 E t = . A benchmark 
competitive equilibrium is (A1)-(A5) for 
00 () E t τ , .  
 
After the green tax reform has been fully implemented, the revenue from the pollution tax is 
devoted to reducing distorting taxes, and keeping the final households transfers at their initial 
level, i.e., { } { }
01 1 1
11 {} { } 0
hH h H
hE c w hE c w Tt t t gT t t t == ,,,, = ,,,, . The new level of the distorting taxes 




















given that the following government budget constraint must hold:  
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The green tax equilibrium is (A1)-(A5) for 
11 () E t τ , . The global gains or losses in welfare from 
the green tax reform are equal to the difference between 
11 0 () ( 0 ) E UtU ττ , −, , so that a 
difference with a positive sign will justify its implementation.   
 
The first and second dividend according to the public finance approach The public finance 
approach (see, i.e., Schöb, 1996, or Mayeres and Proost, 2001).compares the benchmark 
equilibrium with the resulting equilibrium after the green tax is fully implemented. The first 
dividend would be computed as the final effect of the  
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1 1 0
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which is unambiguously positive when distorting taxes decrease, 
10 τ τ < ; and, the second 
dividend is  
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1 τ  is the distorting tax ratio found in (A6). However, the sign of the second dividend is 
uncertain, as there are some trade-offs between changes in consumption and leisure.  
 
The first and second dividends in our definition. In order to compute our definitions, we 

























































Taking the benchmark tax menu as a departure point, we introduce the environmental tax 
1
E t  
while keeping all other tax ratios constant 
0 τ , so that the additional tax revenues are given back 
to households in lump-sum transfers like those found in (A3); that is, 
{ } { }
11 0 0
11 {} { } 0
hH h H
hE c w hE c w Tt t t gT t t t == ,,,, = ,,,, . Due to general equilibrium arguments, a new 
competitive equilibrium and a new tax revenue are obtained from (A1)-(A5) for 
01 () E t τ , . Our 
definition of the first dividend following the introduction of the pollution tax gathers the welfare 
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The sign of the first dividend is uncertain. Although the last difference is positive, because the 
tax reduces pollution, the first difference is probably negative. This is because the pollution tax 
is now distorting the allocation between consumption and leisure and therefore the utility from 
the aggregate of both must be lower than the benchmark level following the revealed 
preferences. The key innovation in our definition of first dividend is that it allows us to decide 
whether the regulatory office should apply a tax on pollution although no green tax reform would 
finally be implemented. That is, if the first dividend is positive, it will make some sense to 
consider the application of the pollution tax because there are some improvements in welfare 
(internalization of external costs).  
Next, we measure the second dividend gathering the general equilibrium effects when the 
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which may be positive or negative.  
 
To sum up, there are important advantages of our definitions, for they allow us to show whether 
a pollution tax should be set to improve welfare, abstracting from green tax reforms. With regard 
to the public fiscal approach definitions of the first and second dividend, however, they only 
show if a green tax reform has to be implemented or not.  
 
The green tax reform, and the optimal taxation scheme. Finally, the analytical example 
studied shows that a green tax reform does not necessarily achieve the optimal taxation. Let us 
take the parametrization for the disutility from pollution 
2 () EE φ φ = . The optimal taxation menu 
{} E t τ
∗∗ ,  in the example is given by  () 0
h
E Ut ττ ∂ ,/ ∂ = , and  () 0
h
EE Utt τ ∂ ,/ ∂ =  which gives 
us the following expression,  
                                                 
25An extreme example is the case when there are no taxes initially, 
0 1 τ = , and then no tax 
revenue or household transfers 
0 0
h T =  exist. After a green tax reform with 
1
E t , tax revenue is 
positive, and then some subsidy will be undertaken to keep household transfers to the initial 
zero level, that is, 
1 0 τ >  so 
1 0 w t <  or 
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Observe that the initial transfers 




∗∗ , , so the green tax reform will not mean to achieve optimal taxation. Furthermore, 
assume that the government never considered a pollution tax, so 
0 0 E t = , but it sets the 
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In consequence, if the government later realizes that the tax menu could be modified with a 
green tax reform, the optimal taxation menu will never be achieved. First, observe that the 












−− = . Then, initial transfers  (0 )
h T τ
∗∗,  for 
each  1 h = ,... H  will remain the same after the implementation of the reform, even in the case 
that the tax on pollution is taken at its optimal value  E t
∗ , which clearly differs from those obtained 
in optimal taxation, i.e., 
1 ()()
hh
EE Tt Tt ττ
∗∗ ∗ ,≠ ,. The issue here is that we cannot achieve the 
optimal taxation menu implementing a tax reform that imposes a constant transfers pattern set 
at its initial level.  
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